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DROIT DE SUITE AND CONFLICTING
PRIORITIES: THE UNLIKELY CASE FOR
VISUAL ARTISTS' RESALE ROYALTY
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
. INTRODUCTION
Democrat Representative Jerrold Nadler from New York
proposed a new piece of legislation called the "American Royalties
Too Act of 2014" which required, with some restrictions, that vis-
ual artists receive royalties if their works of art are resold in an
auction.I By amending Title 17 of the United States Code to in-
clude this provision, the United States would have followed the
European example by adopting a pseudo droit de suite into Copy-
2right law. Droit de suite, often referred in the United States as a
resale royalty right, allows an artist to receive a royalty when his
or her work is resold.3 This is important, especially for a visual
artist, whose artwork is unique and he cannot receive a profit from
making copies (unlike authors or musicians who can mass produce
their works), because the original artist can benefit from a possible
increase in value of the artwork after its original sale.4  The
"American Royalties Too Act of 2014" was a revision of the re-
jected Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011, which received very
little support in Congress; in fact, this was the fifth attempt in pro-
posing resale royalties legislation to Congress.5 With this poor
history of unsuccessful attempts in passing this legislation, it ap-
pears unlikely that visual artists of the United States will ever ben-
efit from resale royalties. This is unfortunate, as the analysis of
1 American Royalties Too Act of 2014, H.R. 4103, 113th Cong. (2014), availa-
ble at https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 113th-congressihouse-bill/4103/text
2 Id; Office of the Register of Copyrights, USCO Resale Royalty Report, 4
(2013). "USCO Resale Royalty Report"3 1d.
4Id. at 11, n.60.
5 Id. at 6-9. These include the Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011, S. 2000,
112th Cong. (20011), Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987, S. 1619, 100th Cong.
(1987), Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986, S. 2796, 99th Cong. (1986),
and Visual Artists' Residual Rights Act of 1978, H.R. 11403, 95th Cong.
(1978).
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the historical and moral elements of droit de suite clearly indicate
that resale royalties are rights that help protect and promote a visu-
al artist's craft. Not only will a droit de suite promote the arts, it is
a matter of fundamental fairness that visual artists receive the con-
tinual benefit of their work, as do other types of artists.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of the Copyright System
1. How Current Law Treats Visual Artists/First Sale Doctrine
According to the United States Copyright Act, artists, in-
cluding visual artists, have a "bundle of exclusive rights" with re-
gards to their works. 6  These basic rights protect most creative
works and are relatively uniform around the world.7 In the United
States, an author has six basic rights in this "bundle:" to copy the
work, to prepare derivate works, to distribute the work, to publical-
ly perform the work, to publically display the work, and for sound
recordings, to publically perform the work through a digital trans-
mission.8 A resale royalty right would allow artists to continually
benefit from their distribution right.9
B. Defining Royalties and Droit de Suite
1. Moral rights, generally
According to French law, all artists, whether visual or not,
have four moral rights: the right of paternity, the right of integrity,
the right to release, and the right to withdraw or modify. 10 These
6 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 10; see 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(l)-(6).
7 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 10. I'm not seeing the portion of the text
"... and are relatively uniform around the world" in this citation.
8 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(6).
9 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
10 In French, la droit b la patermite, la droit au respect de l'oeuvre, la droit de
divulgation, et la droit de retrait ou de repentir. Michael B. Reddy, The Droit de
Suite: Why American Fine Artists Should Have the Right to a Resale Royalty, 15
Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 509, 514 (1995).
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rights are continuous and absolute." These can be considered the
French equivalent of the United States Copyright "bundle" of
rights. The French law differs from the American law because in
the United States, there are no moral rights in the Copyright Act. 12
2. Droit de Suite (France)
a. Albert Vaunois and Evolution
The concept of droit de suite was first mentioned in an arti-
cle written in 1893 in the journal "Chronique de Paris," by Albert
Vaunois, a French attorney.13 In this article, he defended the rights
of artists and highlighted that writers, musicians, and authors could
all have their works represented in multiple areas while visual art-
ists could not perceive their paintings or sculptures ever being re-
produced in this manner. 14 This French tradition of realizing there
are different rights between visual artists and other types of artists
continued when Edouard Mack, another French attorney, ad-
dressed this issue in a report to the Berne Congress of the Interna-
tional Literary and Artistic Association in 1896.' 5 He stated that
the droit de suite converges with moral rights while sharing many
of its characteristics. In order to enact a droit de suite into French
law, the Soci6t6 des Amis du Luxembourg was formed in 1903.6
The Socirt6 wrote a report dealing with inherent unfairness that
artists who create art that can be reproduced, such as photogra-
phers and engravers, could profit from selling their artwork in mul-
tiples whereas other visual artists would lose any profit if their
work were resold.' 7 They submitted text to the French minister
I Reddy at 514.
12 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)-(6).
13 Reddy at 515, 545 n.59.
14 Yann Gaillard, March de I'Art: les chances de la France, StNAT (April 29,
1999), available at http://www.senat.fr/rap/r98-330/r98-33012.html.
15 Reddy at 515.
16 WIPO, Organe Mensuel du Bureau International de L 'Union pour la Protec-
tion des Oeuvre Littkraires et Artistiques, A Berne, 20 LE DROIT D'AUTEUR, 21
(Feb. 5, 1907) ("Le Droit D'Auteur"), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/fr/copyright/120/wipo-pub 120_ 1907_02.p
df.
17 Le Droit D'Auteur, at 21-22.
2015]
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stating that even though the actual object is in possession of the
collector, the right of reproduction remains the property of the cre-
ator of the artwork unless he otherwise disposes of that right.
1 8
The Socit6's beliefs would eventually culminate into France's
1920 droit de suite law.'
9
3. Rationales for Droit de Suite
a. Legal Justifications of Droit de Suite
As Karyn A. Temple Claggett, the Associate Register of
Copyrights and Director of Policy and International Affairs United
States Copyright Office stated in her statement before the Sub-
committee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, "A resale royalty right is typically justified
by the unique way in which some visual artists are affected by the
copyright system., 20 The initial underlying idea of droit de suite
was to allow the artist to benefit and receive meaningful compen-
sation from the increased value of his artwork when it was re-
sold.2' An active droit de suite in the United States fulfills the
Copyright Clause's original intent, which is to promote the pro-
22gress of the arts. Visual artists differ drastically from other types
of artists, such as composers or musicians, because of the means
by which they are able to manipulate and promote their artwork.
The latter gain profits from the mass production and transmission
of their work whereas visual artists create a unique object of which
mass production is impossible.23 According to current copyright
law, once an artist sells his painting, for example, he cannot bene-
18 Le Droit D'Auteur at 22("En consequence, le droit de reproduction demeure
la propridt6 du cr6ateur de l'oeuvre d'art, A moins qu'il n'ait dispose de ce droit
d'une fagon expresse.").
19 Reddy at 515.
20 Karyn A. Temple Claggett, "Moral Rights, Termination Rights, Resale Royal-
ty, and Copyright Term, " Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the
Internet Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives,
113th Congress, 2nd Session, 1 (July 15, 2014).
21 Reddy at 517.
2 2 ld. at 535.
23 Id. at 517.
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fit from subsequent sales of this painting as can other artists. 24 If
his work of art appreciates in value over time, it will usually only
economically benefit a third party, such as an auction house, deal-
er, or collector, and not the artist himself.25 For example, a writer
can receive royalties from every copy of his book sold and can
continually benefit beyond his initial sale, whereas once a visual
artist sells a piece of art, he does not receive economic benefit
from it beyond the initial sale. Ralph Oman, the then-Register of
Copyrights,26 stated in 1989:
Works of visual art present special challenges in
copyright law because of the nature of their creation
and dissemination. They are neither mass produced
nor mass distributed. They often exist only in a sin-
gle copy. After the sale of that unique work the first
sale doctrine of the copyright law has prevented art-
ists from sharing in the increased value of their
works the way composers, playwrights and chore-
ographers can.
27
Although some artists are able to financially benefit from exploit-
ing their work though reproductions or different means of distribu-
tion, this may not be possible for many visual artists; the very na-
ture of the visual art is limited to its original form and there may
not be a market for reproductions or different means of copyright
exploitations.
Having a droit de suite element added to the current Copy-
right Act would, in fact, help further the initial intent of the Copy-
right Clause by "promoting the progress" of the arts.28 If a visual
artist could continually benefit from the resale of his artwork, it
would permit him to profit from the increasing value of his work
24 Id.
25 Temple Claggett at. 2.
26 This was during the pre-VARA hearing in front of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee's Subcommittee on Courts, intellectual Property, and the Administration
of Justice. USCO Resale Royalty Report at 11.
27 Hearing on H.R. 2690, Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989 Before the Subcomm.
On Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 10 1st Cong. 27 (1989).
28 Reddy at 535; see U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8.
2015] 387
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after the first sale. 29 Even if there is a depreciation of the art-
work's value, the artist would still benefit economically in the fu-
ture from a resale. Allowing visual artists to economically profit
after the first sale incentivizes them to continue to create works of
art, thus fulfilling the Copyright Clause's intent. Artists are not
only motivated by the prospect of economic gain, but the mere
creation of additional art and allowing the public to view and ap-
preciate it makes the world more aesthetic and cultured. The Unit-
ed States Supreme Court in Fogerty v. Fantasy unanimously reaf-
firmed this Copyright principle. In this case, the Court stated
through "the provision of a special reward," such a droit de suite,
artists should be rewarded for their creativity thus fueling further
motivation to create. 30 Such "special reward" of continued eco-
nomic incentives would fulfill the intent of the Copyright Clause.
i. Do artists have weak bargaining power?
Historically, the "starving artist" rationale for a droit de
suite has been prevalent in order to create a balance in the per-
ceived weak bargaining position an artist has with his buyers. Alt-
hough there are clearly isolated incidents where artists have been
mistreated because of their weak bargaining power, there is not a
great deal of empirical evidence to substantiate that this is preva-
lent.3 1 In a study done by Randall K. Filer, he analyzed the 1980
census data, investigating artists' earnings, and concluded that art-
ists earned relatively the same amount as others who had similar
personal characteristics and training.32 It is important to note that
the empirical data shows that the starving artist stories meant to
stir one's emotions may no longer be completely accurate.
Another classic argument is that artists have weak bargain-
ing power. Some perceive that there is an imbalance of bargaining
power between artists who want to retain some of their exclusive
copyright rights and collectors or dealers who are cautious about
29 Reddy at 535.
30 Reddy at 545;see Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994).
3" Guy A. Rub, The Unconvincing Case for Resale Royalties, 124 YALE L.J. F.,
1,2(2014).
32 Randall K. Filer, The "Starving Artist"- Myth or Reality? Earnings of Artists
in the United States, 94 J. POL. ECON. 56 (1986).
388
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allowing the artist to retain any of these rights. 33 Some artists must
sign away all of their exclusive copyright rights in order to make a
sale. This is especially prevalent with emerging artists who must
often sign away their rights in order to sell their works. 34 Although
artists may have weaker bargaining power initially and with con-
cerns of copyright rights, they also have more advantages than
other types of artists. For example, visual artists do not have to
have contact with "powerful intermediaries with substantial market
power" in order to sell their work.35 Visual artists do not need to
search though the limited number of record labels or publishers to
find representation; there are over 6,000 art dealers and galleries in
36the United States. Visual artists can receive fair consideration
for their artwork in the competitive market due to the sheer quanti-
ty of ways their artwork can be exposed. Although the bargaining
power of artists is dependent on a case-by-case basis, it is im-
portant to understand that artists can have an element of bargaining
power and not all of them are "starving."
ii. Does the Copyright Act Disfavor Artists?
Despite the evidence that visual artists do not receive pro-
portional benefits for creating works as do other artists, there are
arguments that the Copyright Act may in fact favor visual artists.
Those who oppose a United States droit de suite have argued that
all artists, including visual artists, have equal rights from copyright
law because they all have the right to sell their work and license
reproductions. 37 It is entirely possible that a visual artist could
make more money from an initial sale than might other artists,
such as an author selling a manuscript, which may then be sold in
copies. Additionally, copyright law helps correct market failures
for non-visual artists. Copies of non-visual works are nearly iden-
tical substitutes for the originals. Without copyright protection,
33 Design and Artists Copyright Society, DA CS Artists Survey, 3 (2011), availa-
ble at http://www.dacs.org.uk/DACSO/media/DACSDocs/DACS-artist-
surveysummary.pdf.
34 USCO Resale Royalty Report at 12, n.64.
31 Rub at 2.
361d
37 USCO Resale Royalty Report at 32.
2015] 389
7
Janevicius: Droit de Suite and Conflicting Priorities: The Unlikely Case for
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXV: 383
publishers would be able to drive prices down to the marginal cost
of creating the work by making these perfect copies, thus destroy-
ing the non-visual artist's incentive to create as he will not be able
to earn back the costs of creation.38 Copyright law fixed this prob-
lem by giving reproduction rights to artists thus making it illegal to
copy the work without the artist's permission. 39 Visual artists,
however, do not suffer from this reproduction issue because, in
general, a copy of a work of visual art is not an identical or suita-
ble substitute for the original artwork.4 ° Copying a visual'work of
art does not have the same market and economic effect on the au-
thor as copying a non-visual work of art. Because of this, a visual
artist is not barred from collecting the full value of the artwork (in-
cluding his marginal costs, fixed costs, and expected revenue from
the artwork) during the initial sale in the primary market.41 The
Copyright Act was meant to correct the market failure for non-
visual artists, as it has done. Arguments advocating that the Copy-
right Act disfavors visual artists are misplaced because the wrong
that the Act is meant to remedy may not necessarily be applicable
to visual artists.
C. Droit de Suite Policy around the World
International copyright protection first came to being in the
middle of the nineteenth century through the use of bilateral trea-
ties.42 Today, over seventy different countries worldwide recog-
nize some form of droit de suite for their visual artists; over thirty
have adopted these laws since the 1992 United States Copyright
Office Report.43
38 Rub at 3.
39 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) ("The owner of copyright under this title has the ex-
clusive rights to.. .reproduce the copyright work in copies or phonorecords.").40 Rub at 3.
41id.
42 WIPO Handbook on Intellectual Property: Policy, Law and Use, WIPO, 262
(2004).
43 USCO Resale Royalty Report at 2.
390
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1. The Berne Convention for the Protection ofLiterary and Artistic
Works
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works was formulated based on the need for a uniform,
international system to protect and enforce copyright rights.44 The
Berne Convention was adopted on September 9, 1886, and is the
oldest international copyright treaty. 4 5 It has been continually re-
vised in order to adapt to the changing field and needs presented
by international copyright. 46 France proposed adding a resale roy-
alty provision to the Beme Convention, which was added in
194847. The Berne Convention contains a droit de suite provision
providing "an inalienable right to an interest in any sale of the
work subsequent to the first transfer by the author of the work" for
all visual and non-visual art.4 8 When this provision was added,
many countries opposed a resale royalty. In order to ease these
countries' concerns, an additional provision was added making
droit de suite optional.49 It was not necessary for Member States
of the Berne Convention to implement this right but the right is re-
ciprocal; if a country did not implement a droit de suite, its citizens
could not receive a resale royalty in other countries. This is an
unusual provision because this is one of the only exceptions to the
Berne Convention's obligation that Member States treat other
Member States in the same manner in which they would treat their
own citizens. 51 The United States is a signatory to the Berne Con-
44 WIPO Handbook on Intellectual Property at 262.
45 WIPO Handbook on Intellectual Property at 262.
46 id.
47 USCO Resale Royalty Report at 4.
48 World Intellectual Property Organization, Berne Convention for the Protec-
tion of Literary and Artistic Works, Art. 14ter(l), "Droit de suite" in Works of
Art and Manuscripts (Sept. 9, 1886).
49 Id. at Art. 14ter(2)( The protection provided by the preceding paragraph may
be claimed in a country of the Union only if legislation in the country to which
the author belongs to permits, and to the extent permitted by the country where
this protection is claimed.).5 0 id.
"' Id. at Art. 5(1) ("Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are
protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the coun-
try of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter
2015]
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vention; it has not, however, implemented a droit de suite because,
according to Article 14ter(2), it was not required to do so to be a
52
signatory. A consequence of not implementing droit de suite is
that American artists cannot receive a resale royalty if their art-
work is resold on the international secondary art market to a coun-
try that does have a droit de suite. The secondary art market is an
international market, and this can pose as a problem if artists can-
not receive royalties when their works are sold in a country that
does offer a droit de suite.
2. EU 2001 Directive
In 2001, in an effort to harmonize resale royalty rights, the
European Union adopted a Directive requiring its Member States
to establish droit de suite legislation by 2006. Many observed an
imbalance in the European market because droit de suite was ap-
plied in different ways between Member States, and it was com-
pletely absent in others.54 Since this right applies in the country
where the sale occurs, there was the potential for art transactions to
move from countries that had this right to ones that did not in order
to avoid extra costs. 55 The European Commission decided that in
order to balance the European art market, either all Member States
had to adopt a resale royalty, or it would be uniformly abolished.
The Commission decided to institute a consistent droit de suite and
adopted Directive 2001/84/EC in 2001 which established this.
56
This Directive required EU member states to create droit de suite
legislation where a work of visual art was resold under the purview
grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this Conven-
tion.").
52 USCO Resale Royalty Report at 5.
53 Council Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 27 September 2001 on the Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of an
Original Work of Art, WIPO, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32-36 (2001), available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?fileid= 180301.
54 Claire McAndrew, Observations on the Art Trade over 25 Years, THE
EUROPEAN FINE ART FOUNDATION, 176 (2012) available at
https://www.tefaf.com/media/tefafmedia/TEFAF%20AMR%202012%20DEF_
LR.pdf.
55 Id.
56
d.
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of "art market professionals. 57 This broad language allowed these
European countries to make laws to include works resold by the
entire art market, such as dealers, collectors, and auctions. 58 It al-
lowed some flexibility, with some regulation, for Member States
implementing their own droit de suite, such as giving the Member
State authority to set the threshold resale price,5 what percent roy-
alty, and how the collection of the royalty would be managed.6 °
Since January 1, 2010, the date that the Directive required full im-
plementation of a resale royalty by its Member States, this is now a
part of national laws across Europe.
61
On February 17, 2014, The EU Commissioner for Internal
Market and Services, issued "Key Principles and Recommenda-
tions in the Management of Author Resale Right" which provided
recommendations to help solve the transparency issue and various
administrative problems Europe has experienced with implement-
ing droit de suite.62 Representatives of collection agencies, artists,
and art market professionals signed this document in order to bet-
ter facilitate the solutions of these problems. 63 The "Key Princi-
ples and Recommendations in the Management of Author Resale
Right" proposed that participating parties, all collective manage-
ment organizations administering droit de suite to artists, cooper-
ate by sharing information with one another, in order to increase
64transparency. It also recommended to increase the understanding
57 Council Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 27 September 2001 on the Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of an
Original Work ofArt, Art. 1(2), 34.581 Id. at Art. 1.
59 Council Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 27 September 2001 on the Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of an
Original Work ofArt, Art. 3(2), 35. This right is whether the threshold price for
a resale royalty would be less than the maximum C3000 set up by the European
Commission.
60 Id. at Arts. 4(2)-(3), 6(2).
61 Id. at Art. 8(2)-(3).
62 See Resale Right, Press Release Database, Copyright: Representatives of the
European art market commit to improving how the author resale right is man-
aged, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEX-14-
0214 en.htm. (Feb. 14, 2014).
63 id.
64 Key Principles and Recommendations on the management of the Author Re-
sale Right, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 3 (Feb. 17, 2014) available at
2015] 393
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and overall awareness of the resale right for all parties involved by
publishing clear guidelines, organizing seminars, and providing in-
formation to buyers.
65
3. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom is the third largest global art-market
and the largest European Union market.66 The UK began its im-
plementation of a droit de suite in 2006 with legislation that ap-
plied only to living artists.67 It then expanded this right to estates
and heirs of deceased artists in 2012.68 The UK actually opted to
have a lower threshold price for a resale royalty of C1000, com-
pared to the European Commission's suggested of C3000.69 After
implementing its own droit de suite, the UK's Intellectual Property
Office ("IPO") conducted a study in 2008 to determine whether
the resale royalty had an effect on the UK's art market.70 It con-
cluded that, "the art market in the UK, either despite or because of
the introduction of [droit de suite], appears to be doing well.'
Although this study was conducted when the resale royalty only
applied to living artists, the report found no evidence that the art
market was leaving the UK because of the implementation of droit
http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/copyright/docs/resale/ 140214-resale-right-
key-principles-and-recommendations en.pdf
65 Id. at 4-5
66 McAndrew at 23.
67 Artist's Resale Right Regulations, 2006, S.I. 346, Explanatory Note, Reg. 17,
10 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2006/346/contents/made.
68 Artist's Resale Right (Amendment) Regulations, 2009, S.I. 2792, art. 2
(U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/2792/pdfs/uksi_20092792_en.pdf
69 Artist's Resale Right Regulations, 2006, Reg. 12(3)(b), 4; Council Directive
2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September
2001 on the Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of an Original Work of
Art, Art. 3(2), 35.
70 USCO Resale Royalty Report at 15.
71 Kathryn Graddy, Noah Horowitz, & Stefan Szymanski, A Study Into The Ef-
fect On The UK Art Market Of The Introduction Of The Artist's Resale Right,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, 17 (2008), available at
http://people.brandeis.edu/-kgraddy/government/ARRFinalnc.pdf
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72de suite. Tania Spriggens, a member of the UK's Design and
Artists Copyright Society, commented on this 2008 study:
The art market has fluctuated enormously since
2006. In fact, in 2007, it grew astronomically huge.
There was a massive bubble, which subsequently
burst, that was nothing to do with the resale right.
And all the evidence we've seen is that, lots of fac-
tors affect the art market, not the resale right.
73
In its 2008 study, the United Kingdom's Intellectual Prop-
erty Offices found that the Artist's Resale Right did not "divert
business away from the UK." In fact, the UK's art market size has
increased at a faster rate than other markets.
During the summer of 2014, the UK's Intellectual Property
Office ("IPO") conducted a survey of professionals in the art mar-
ket in order to find empirical evidence of the effect of the artist's
resale right ("ARR") on the UK art market.74 This survey also fo-
cused on the lower payment band of artists (those who sell artwork
valued from C1000-3000)75 to determine whether the ARR was
affecting lower income artists.76 The survey analyzed forty-three
responses from art galleries, art dealers, auction houses, and the
two collecting agencies that collect the royalties from ARR - Art-
ists' Collecting Society (ACS) and Design and Artists Copyright
Society (DACS).77 This is the most recent, comprehensive survey
on the effects of the ARR on those present in the British art mar-
ket. Two thirds of the participants reported that the ARR applied
to less than 25% of their art sales and that most of their sales that
ARR applied to were above C3000.78
72 1d. at2.
73 Resale Royalty Public Round Table, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, (April 23,
2013) at 17.
74 Artist's Resale Right - Summary of Survey Findings, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY OFFICE, 1, (2015) available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata
/file/375378/artists-resale-rights-ipo-survey.pdf.
7' The survey used Euros as currency.76 id.
77 id.
78 id.
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4. France
France was the first country to officially implement droit
de suite on May 20, 1920. 79 This law was enacted as an addition
to its copyright law, which some believed was inadequate in pro-
tecting artists.8g This law allowed visual artists to be on an "equal
economic footing" as other artists, such as composers and writers,
by creating a resale royalty right for visual artists, which the other
artists already enjoyed .8  Artists could receive a percentage of the
sales price, depending on the price, each time their original art-
work was resold at a public auction.8 2 In 1957, a new law was en-
acted and changed the fixed percentage to three percent, no matter
the resale price of the artwork, in order to simplify collecting the
royalty.8 3 The resale royalty right only applies to artwork resold at
a public auction. Marie-Anne Ferry-Fall, member of Socit6 des
Auters dans les Arts Graphiques et Plastiques, stated,
In France, it's the highest author's right and it's
very, very important for an artist to follow the ca-
reer of their works and to receive something for the
auctioneers who make money, and that's a good
thing, but they make money with their works and
artists must benefit of it.
8 4
This shows that France continues to find this moral right crucial
for its artists.
79 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 4; see also Carole M. Vickers, The Applica-
bility of the Droit de Suite in the United States, 3 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REv.
433, 438, n.16 (1980).
0 ld. at 438.
81 Vickers at 438.
82 The artist would receive one percent of the sales price if the artwork was re-
sold for 50-10,000 francs, one and a half percent if the artwork was resold for
10,000-20,000 francs, two percent if the artwork was resold for 20,000-50,000
francs, and three percent if the artwork was resold for over 50,000 francs. Id. at
438, n.20.
83 Id. at 439, n.23.
84 Resale Royalty Public Round Table at 36-37.
396
14
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol25/iss2/5
DR OIT DE SUITE
5. Australia
When implementing their own resale royalty bill in 2009,
Australian Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts ob-
served: "[h]istorically, the achievements of our visual artists have
not been recognized to the same extent as those of our composers,
authors and performers . . . . [T]his bill[] addresses a situation
which is plainly inequitable." 85 The Resale Royalty Right for Vis-
ual Artists Act provides artists with a 5% royalty on sales over
$1,000 AUD.86 This resale right, however, only lasts for the life of
the artist plus seventy years. 87 Sellers of the art have a ninety day
limit to report, in writing, the resale with enough information that a
collection agency can distribute the possible royalty.88  What
makes this bill unique is that it is prospective and no royalty is due
in the first sale if a work was acquired before the bill took effect
and resold; only subsequent sales will qualify for the resale royal-
ty.
8 9
Similar to the United States, before implementing the bill,
the Australian parliament requested a report to analyze potential
impacts and whether there was support for the bill.90 The Austral-
ian Copyright Council first supported an Australian droit de suite
in 1989 and the Australian Report showed prevalent support for its
implementation, especially to better protect Indigenous visual art-
ists and their rights in the market. 91 With the support of the Aus-
tralia Report, the droit de suite was implemented in Australia in
June 2010.
85 Copyright AgencyiViscopy, Comments Submitted in Response to U.S. Copy-
right Office's Sept. 19, 2012 Notice of Inquiry at 3 (Dec. 2012).
86 Resale Royalty Right for Visual Artists Act 2009, No. 125 (Austl.), §§
10(1)(a), 18, available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2009A00 125.87 Resale Royalty Right for Visual Artists Act 2009 at §32.
8 Id. at §28.
89 1d. at § 11.
90 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Climate Change, Water,
Environment and the Arts, Resale Royalty Right for Visual Artists Bill 2008
("Australia Report"), 2 (Feb. 2009).
91 Id. at 41;see also Rupert Myer, Commonwealth Of Australia, Report Of The
Contemporary Visual Arts and Craft Inquiry 82 (June 14, 2002) ("Myer Re-
port"), http://arts.gov.aulsites/default/fi
les/pdfs/Report of theContemporaryVisualArts and Craft _Inquiry.pdf.
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In 2013, the Australian government published a compre-
hensive review of its droit de suite bill. In its corresponding dis-
cussion paper, the Australian government received input from art92
market professionals, artists, and visual arts organizations. The
paper reported that as of its publication, 26 percent or artwork that
was being resold was eligible for the royalty, 91 percent of royal-
ties distributed were to living artists, and the majority of royalties
being received by artists valued between $51-$500. 9" This shows
that Australian artists are receiving royalties for the resale of their
artwork and not only at the high end.
94
D. Current Policy and Law in the USA: Attempts to Introduce
Droit de Suite
1. Historical Efforts in the USA
The United States has unsuccessfully attempted to imple-
ment droit de suite legislation many times in the past. After sign-
ing the Berne Convention in 1928, the United States did not seri-
ously consider droit de suite legislation until 1973 when the artist
Robert Rauschenberg's 1958 painting "Thaw" was sold at auc-
tion.95 Rauschenberg initially sold his painting for $900, but when
it was resold in 1973 for $85,000, Rauschenberg did not receive
any royalties for this sale.96 This seems to be unjust for artists be-
cause they are not only not able to benefit in the same ways as oth-
er artists, but they possibly could economically lose due to unfair
92 Review of the Resale Royalty Scheme, Discussion Paper and Terms of Refer-
ence, OFFICE FOR THE ARTS, DEPARTMENT OF REGIONAL AUSTRALIA, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, ARTS AND SPORT, 1 (June 2013) available at
http://arts.gov.au/sites/default/files/visualarts/Discussion%20Paper% 2 0% 2 02 01
3%20Review%20of/o2OResale%2ORoyalty%2OScheme.pdf.
93 Review of the Resale Royalty Scheme, Discussion Paper and Terms of Refer-
ence, OFFICE FOR THE ARTS, DEPARTMENT OF REGIONAL AUSTRALIA, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, ARTS AND SPORT at 4.
94 If the majority of artists are receiving between $51-$500, or 5% of the resale
value, these artworks were sold between $1,020-$10,000.
95 USCO Resale Royalty Report at 6.
96 Id, see Patricia Cohen, Artists File Lawsuits, Seeking Royalties, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/arts/design/artists-file-suit-
against-sothebys-christies-and-ebay.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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practices in the secondary market. Rauschenberg began fighting
for droit de suite rights for artists after this event.97 According to
his son, Christopher Rauschenberg, his father's "hard work was
beginning to pay off, but not for him."98 What he meant by this
was that the auction house benefitted from the increase in value of
the painting, due to the hard work of Robert Rauschenberg over
the past fifteen years, and not the artist himself. "Implementing
legislation that equitably distributes the proceeds of creative output
will cost taxpayers absolutely nothing, yet would mean a great deal
to the artistic community."
99
Previous attempts have been made to implement resale
royalty rights for visual artists in the United States. In 1978, Rep-
resentative Henry Waxman introduced the Visual Artist Residual
Rights Act of 1978 ("Waxman Bill") during the 95 th Congress
proposing that a visual artist would receive a 5% royalty on a re-
sale over $1000.100 Part of the proposal required the work to be
registered with the National Commission on the Visual Arts,
which would regulate and distribute the royalties. 101 This was a
prospective right applying only to resale that occurred one year af-
ter the installation of the Waxman Bill.'0 2 In 1986, Senator Ed-
ward Kennedy proposed the unsuccessful Visual Artists Rights
Amendment of 1986, providing that visual artists receive 7% of
the difference between the sales price and the purchase price when
it was resold for over $5000.103 The next year, the Visual Artist
Rights Act of 1978 (the "Kennedy-Markey Bill") was proposed by
Senator Kennedy asking for a 7% royalty for works of art sold for
$1000 that were registered with the U.S. Copyright Office. 104 Dur-
ing the hearings for this bill, Representative Edward Markey stated
97 id.
98 Christopher Rauschenberg, Artists Deserve Royalties Too, HUFFINGTON POST
(July 15, 2014) available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/christopher-
rauschenberg/artists-deserve-royaities b 5588388.html.
99 Christopher Rauschenberg, Artists Deserve Royalties Too, HUFFINGTON POST.
100 Visual Artists' Residual Rights Act of 1978, H.R. 11403, 95th Cong. (1978).
101 H.R. 11403 §§ 3(a), 5(c), (1978).
1021d at § 8.
103 Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986, S. 2796, 99th Cong. (1986).
104 visual Artists Rights Act of 1987, S. 1619, 100th Cong. §§ 3, 8 (1987).
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that visual artists "need the right to participate economically in the
success of the work."'
0 5
2. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA)
The United States finally joined the Berne Convention
when Congress executed the Berne Convention Implementation
Act in 1988."' The United States' main motivation in implement-
ing this Act was to gain more international intellectual property
protection,'0 7 rather than promoting American artists' rights.'0 8 In
order to comply with the Berne Convention, the United States
needed to enact some form of federal moral rights legislation. 0 9
Despite opposition to federal moral rights, Congress passed the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, but only after removing the re-
sale right provision. 110 This amendment of the 1976 Copyright
Act is narrowly defined to apply to visual artwork 1 ' that would
otherwise be eligible for copyright protection."12 The only men-
tion of resale royalties for visual rights in VARA was the request
for the Copyright Office to organize a study on the feasibility of
success of future resale royalty legislation. 1 13 The implementation
of VARA was the first step in granting visual artists additional
rights in the United States, but, compared to the rest of the world,
105 The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987: Hearings on S. 1619 Before the Sub-
comm. On Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. On the
Judiciary, 100th Cong. 15(1987).
106 Patty Gerstenblith, Art, Cultural Heritage, and the Law: Cases and Materials
174 (Carolina Academic Press, 3rd ed. 2012).
107 This may have been due to the increase in computer software during the time
of the Act's implementation. Gerstenblith, 174.
108 Id.
109 Article 6bis of the Berne Convention states:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even
after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the
right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any dis-
tortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogato-
ry action in relation to, the said work, which would be preju-
dicial to his honour or reputation.
110 USCO Resale Royalty Report at 7.
"'1 This cannot be a work made for hire. 17 U.S.C. § 101
112 17 U.S.C. § 101
113 id.
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it is lacking. VARA grants very limited moral rights to artists, in-
cluding the right of attribution and integrity, is limited to the dura-
tion of the artist's life, and may be waived by the artist. 1
14
3. Register of Copyrights 'Report on Resale Royalties of 1992
When the Copyright Office published its comprehensive
report, requested by the implementation of VARA in 1992, it con-
cluded that it was "not persuaded that sufficient economic and
copyright policy justification exists" to have resale royalties in the
United States. 1 5 In the report, the Copyright Office expressed its
concern that implementing a droit de suite in the United States
could harm visual artists because it would decrease profits from
the primary market to compensate for economic gain in future
sales. 116 The report also suggested that United States should wait
until more members of the European communities granted droit de
suite before deciding whether resale royalties should be imple-
mented to harmonize with Europe. 17 At the time of the report, on-
ly thirty-six countries had implemented a droit de suite, whereas
today, over seventy countries, including the entire European Un-
ion, have implemented this right. 118 Presently, Europe has acted
with droit de suite and the United States has a justified reason to
implement it itself because the European Union harmonized its
droit de suite laws. 119 If the United States implemented a droit de
suite, not only would it become more harmonized with Europe, but
also American artists could receive royalties when selling their
works abroad through reciprocity.
I14 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(a), (d), (e).
115 Droit De Suite: The Artist's Resale Royalty, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, xv
(Dec. 1992), available at http://www.copyright.gov/history/droit-de-suite.pdf.
"'6Id. at 133.
117 Id. at 149.
l.8Id. at xi, 149.
119 Lehman, Resale Royalties Round Table, pg. 159; see USCO Resale Royalty
Report, pg. 13.
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4. Legal Concerns with a Droit de Suite
Implementing a droit de suite in the United States raises
potential legal and Constitutional issues because a droit de suite
potentially interferes with an individual's bundle of property
rights. Critics have argued that a resale royalty in the United States
violates both the First Sale Doctrine as well as constitutes as a
Fifth Amendment regulatory taking.
a. First Sale Doctrine
Some critics of a resale royalty bill believe it would inter-
fere with the First Sale Doctrine of the Copyright Act. This doc-
trine gives the right to the purchaser of a lawfully produced copy
of a copyrighted work to dispose of it as he or she wishes without
permission from the original copyright owner. 120 Critics of a droit
de suite in the United States believe that implementing this right
would violate this doctrine by preventing buyers of the artwork
from ever obtaining complete title over the artwork.' 2' Supporters
argue that a droit de suite would not violate the First Sale Doctrine
because a resale royalty only requires payment when the artwork is
resold and does not prevent the free transfer or property. 122 The
current owner of the artwork would not be prevented by a resale
royalty from reselling the work of art freely because the droit de
suite would be considered more of a tax instead of a property re-
striction.
123
120 17 U.S.C. §109(a) - Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 (3), the
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title is enti-
tled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of
the possession of that copy or phonorecord.
121 USCO, Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis, at 58 (Dec. 2013); see also
Christie's, Inc. & Sotheby's, Inc., Comments Submitted in Response to U.S.
Copyright Office's Sept. 19, 2012 Notice of Inquiry re Resale Royalty Right at
7 (Dec. 5, 2012).
122 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 58.
123 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 58.
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b. Fifth Amendment Constitutional Issues: Regulatory Taking
A droit de suite in the United States raises concerns regard-
ing Fifth Amendment property rights, specifically the takings
clause. These concerns are raised in conjunction with whether a re-
sale royalty can be applied retroactively to the resale of works of
art that were purchased from an artist before the implementation of
the droit de suite. 114 If the droit de suite was implemented retroac-
tively, it could negatively affect the bundle of property rights that
are granted to Americans, especially the right of alienation. When
the current purchaser bought the work of art, he or she relied on
the First Sale Doctrine; when purchasing the artwork, the purchas-
er gained ownership interest in the physical object and the artist
would no longer have this interest. 125 If, however, the artist can
now instill a royalty requirement on the purchaser, this potentially
destroys the alienability right of the purchaser.
Having a governmental regulation interfere with an indi-
vidual's property rights could be considered a regulatory taking. 126
A regulatory taking is a fact-specific inquiry by balancing the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations, and the character of the govern-
ment action. 127 A resale royalty could have a significant
''economic impact" on some parties because of the amount of the
royalty to be paid to the artist. This could be to a lessened degree if
there is a cap on the amount of royalty the artist could receive. 128 If
a resale royalty were to be enacted retroactively, this could affect
someone's "reasonable investment-backed expectation."' 129 A col-
lector who purchased a work of art could not have had a reasona-
ble expectation that the purchased artwork would now be worth
less when resold because an artist would be entitled to a percent-
age of the sales.' 30 This could severely burden the buyer's "in-
124 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 60.
125 17 U.S.C. § 109.
26 As compared to a per se taking which requires a permanent physical occupa-
tion of someone's property. See Loretto v. Manhattan Teleprompter CATV
Corp, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).127 Penn Central Transp. Co v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
1281 Id. at 124; USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 62.
129 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
130 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 62.
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vestment-backed expectations" of his or her property. An opposing
argument is that if the value of property is reduced, this is the same
as a taking of the property.1 31 The "character of the government
action" could lean towards either party's favor.' 32 Supporters of a
resale royalty could argue that droit de suite is so prevalent around
the rest of the world and it is directed at a very limited group of
people, that this government action could not be considered ex-
traordinary. 33 Those who oppose a droit de suite could argue that
placing a burden on someone's physical property is a mass depar-
ture from the established beliefs of property rights. 134 The Penn
Central test can certainly weigh in either side's favor; thus the out-
come of whether a droit de suite would be considered a regulatory
taking cannot be accurately predicted.
5. California Resale Royalties Act
In 1976, California enacted the California Resale Royalties
Act (the "CRRA"): the only resale royalty legislation that has
passed in the United States. 35 This act applies to sales by both pri-
vate dealers and public auctions.' 36 The CRRA provides that
"[w]henever a work of fine art is sold and the seller resides in Cali-
fornia or the sale takes place in California, the seller or the seller's
agent shall pay to the artist of such work of fine art or to such art-
ist's agent 5 percent of the amount of such sale."' 137 Before pay-
ment of a royalty, the CRRA imposes several conditions which
must first be satisfied. 138 The CRRA also provides that the seller's
agent must pay the resale royalty to the artist, specifically, "[w]hen
a work of fine art is sold at an auction or by a gallery, dealer, bro-
131 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
132 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
133 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 62-63.
134 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 62.
135 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 20.
136 Vickers, at 445.
137 Cal. Civ. Code § 986(a)
138 (1) The artist must be a U.S. or California citizen for at least two years; (2)
the sale must take place in or the seller must reside in California; (3) the work
must satisfy the conditions of being a work of fine art according to California
law; (4) the work must be sold for a profit; and (5) the work must be sold for
$1,000 or greater. See Cal. Civ. Code § 986.
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ker, museum, or other person acting as the agent for the seller the
agent shall withhold 5 percent of the amount of the sale, locate the
artist and pay the artist."' 39 The agent has 90 days to locate the art-
ist to pay the 5 percent royalty; if it is unable to find the artist dur-
ing this time frame, it must pay the royalty to the California Arts
Council who then has seven years to find the artist or the funds
will be used by the California Arts Council for "use in acquiring
fine art.', 140 Finally, if the agent does not provide the artist with the
royalty, the artist may "bring an action for damages within three
years after the date of sale or one year after the discovery of the
sale, whichever is longer."
141
Many issues went unaddressed with this act. First, the Cali-
fornia Resale Royalties Act did not have a requirement to publical-
ly disclose sales information. This is problematic because if the
sales are not publically disclosed, artists and the collection agen-
cies may not be aware that their artwork was resold. 142 Although
unlikely, this could be a disincentive for a dealer to inform the art-
ist of the resale, thus preventing the dealer from losing money with
the resale royalty. Another possible issue is that artist may not
want to bring an action if the artist is not paid. A seller is often not
a stranger to the artist and many artists may fear jeopardizing their
careers if they lose the relationship with this seller. 143 Another en-
forcement problem could have arisen in connection to the provi-
sion that the droit de suite terminates upon the artist's death and
would not apply to a work of art whose resale price is less than the
original purchase price.144 A dishonest seller could sell artwork by
both living and dead artists as a bundle to a buyer with the artwork
by the deceased artist overpriced and the artwork by the living art-
ist underpriced, thus avoiding the resale royalty.145
This act has not gone unchallenged since its enactment,
with two major court decisions concerning preemption by federal
139 Cal. Civ. Code § 986(a)(1).
140 Cal. Civ. Code § 986(a)(3), (a)(5).
141 Cal. Civ. Code § 986(a)(3).
142 Vickers, at 446.
143 id.
144 The resale royalty shall not apply to "the a resale after the death of such art-
ist" and "to the resale of the work of fin art for a gross sales price less than the
purchase price paid by the seller." Cal. Civ. Code §§ 986(l)(b)(3)-(4).
145 Vickers, at 446.
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copyright law. In Morseburg v. Balyon, an art dealer brought suit
to avoid paying royalties claiming federal copyright law preempt-
ed the CRRA. 14 6 The Ninth Circuit held on appeal that since the
transaction occurred prior to the Copyright Act of 1976, the Copy-
right Act of 1909 did not preempt CRRA. 147 This was the first of
many suits challenging the validity of the CRRA.
The CRRA was challenged and held invalid in Estate of
Graham v. Sotheby's Inc.148 The Plaintiffs, agents of California
sellers, claimed Sotheby's had sold their artwork at a New York
auction, but did not pay the CRRA's required royalty. 149 Sotheby's
replied that the CRRA violated the Constitution's Commerce
Clause because it "regulate[d] transactions that [took] place wholly
outside of California."' 150 When looking at the CRRA's legislative
history, the court noted that the California legislature discussed
and ultimately rejected the royalty only applying to in-state sales
due to the fear that the art market would leave California in order
to avoid paying the royalty.151 The court found that artwork consti-
tutes a "thing" in interstate commerce when an artwork is sold
from one state to another, thus falling under Congress' power from
the Commerce Clause.' 52 The court also found the CRRA "sub-
stantially affected" interstate commerce because the statute had to
do with "commerce or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms."'153 The Central District
Court of California held that the CRRA had the "effect of control-
ling commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of Cali-
fornia" thus in violation of the Commerce Clause by interrupting
the federal government's right to control commerce between
states. 154 Despite having a severability clause in its text, the court
found the CRRA invalid not only because it violated the Com-
merce Clause but also the California legislature would not have
146 Morseburg v. Balyon, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18831, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
147 Morseburg v. Baylon, 621 F.2d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 1980).
148 Estate of Graham v. Sotheby's Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
149 Id. at 1119.
150 Id. at 1120; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8,cl. 3.
"S! Estate of Graham, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1126.
152 Id. at 1123; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59; 115 S.Ct.
1624, 1629 (1995).153 Id. at 1123, quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; 115 S.Ct. 1624.
114 Estate of Graham, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1124-25.
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enacted the CRRA if it only applied to transactions occurring with-
in California. 
55
California has had extreme difficulty in the enforcement of
the CRAA. Many dealers and parties in sales are not complying
with these new rules. According to a New York Times article, since
the enactment of the CRRA, only around 400 artists have received
royalties in amounts totaling $328,000."' In addition to the non-
compliance, the California Arts Council struggled with administer-
ing the royalties; BALA reported that the California Arts Council
was holding $13,435 in royalties for artists whose locations could
not be found. 157 Due to these inconsistencies, it is extremely diffi-
cult to see the effects, whether positive or negative, the CRRA has
had on individual artists and the art market.
6. Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011 (EVAA)
In 2011, Representative Nadler, as well as Wisconsin
Democratic Senator Herb Kohl, introduced the Equity for Visual
Artists Act of 2011 (the "EVAA") which proposed collecting a 7
percent royalty if a visual artist's artwork was resold at auction for
at least $10,000.158 This 7 percent of the sale price would be ac-
cumulated by a collecting society and split between the artist and
an escrow account created to support a nonprofit museum in the
United States. 159 The money given to the museum would promote
its further collecting of artworks.' 60 This bill failed as Representa-
tive Nadler was unable to gain any cosponsors, and it was never
voted on after the 1 1 2th Congress finished in 2012.161
155 The extraterritorial reach could not be severed from the bill, thus the entire
bill had to be struck down. Id. at 1126.
156 Patricia Cohen, Artists File Lawsuits, Seeking Royalties, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov.
1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/arts/design/artists-file-suit-
a Tainst-sothebys-christies-and-ebay.html?pagewanted=all.
USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 23.
158 See Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011, H.R. 3688, 112th Cong. (2011), §
2, ("EVAA").
'
59 EVAA § 3.160 EVAA § 3.
161 EVAA Co-Sponsors, available at https://www.congress.govibill/l 12th-
congress/house-bill/3688/cosponsors
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7. Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis from the Office of the
Register of Copyrights
In December 2013, the United States Copyright Office re-
leased its "Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis" where it com-
piled its findings since it released the 1992 report. After analyzing
the many positive and negative aspects of having a droit de suite in
the United States, the report found that many artists in the United
States are disadvantaged compared to other authors, such as liter-
ary or musical, due to the structure of the current copyright sys-
tem.162 The Copyright Office acknowledged that the lack of data
available on this topic did prevent it from making a definitive con-
clusion about droit de suite in the United States, but it did recog-
nize that the data it did have showed that visual artists could not
benefit in the same way as other artists due to the fact that visual
art is not commonly distributed in copies, as are other forms of
art.' 63 The nature of visual art limits an artist's financial gain. The
Copyright Office urged Congress to consider ways to resolve this
problem by finding solutions to encourage visual artists to contin-
ue their craft. Although over seventy countries have adopted resale
royalty legislation, the Copyright Office believed that there may be
other, more effective, ways of accomplishing these goals. Since
there is a significant lack of information, the Copyright Office cau-
tioned about the actual effect a droit de suite would have on Unit-
ed States' artists.1 64 The Copyright Office concluded by indicating
that it does support resale royalty legislation, but it is also im-
portant to explore other options such as voluntary initiatives or en-
couragement. It cautioned Congress that if it does propose a droit
de suite, it must be advantageous to the greatest number of artists
while, most importantly, posing the least disturbance on the art
market.165 It also raised the consideration of waiting to implement
resale royalty legislation until even more data can be collected and
the effect can be further studied. 166 This is very similar to the end
recommendations of the 1992 report, which suggested waiting un-
162 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 65.
163 Id.
164id.
165 Id. at 66.
16 6 id.
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til further empirical data was collected. There may never be ade-
quate information to decide whether a droit de suite is feasible in
the United States.
III. ECONOMIC DISCUSSION OF DROITDE SUITE
A. How a Resale Royalty May Affect the Overall Market - An
Economic Approach
Although there is a lack of empirical data regarding the art
market and the potential effects of a droit de suite, an economic
analysis can be conducted. A resale royalty can be treated as an
excise tax. An excise tax is a governmental tax on the sale, use, or
production of certain commodities or services,1 67 and can be in-
cluded in the price of the product. 168 Even though there is little da-
ta on the effect of droit de suite on the art market, performing an
elasticity analysis can be instructive. The economic issue that
needs to be explored is the demand curve's elasticity 169 for works
of art that have a resale royalty.170 If the demand curve for artwork
subject to a droit de suite is elastic, then the total amount of money
flowing into the secondary art market will decrease. According to
economic theory, if the secondary art market decreases, it will also
affect the primary art market with a depressive effect. 171 Some fac-
tors that would affect the art market's elasticity include the price
position of the product on the demand curve, the availability of
substitutes, and how much of the consumer's income the purchase
of this product represents. 172 Therefore, if any of these factors can
be easily influenced by the change in price, it would make the de-
mand curve more elastic. This can be easily done since the price of
an artwork can be high, thus a purchaser spending a high percent-
age of his income on the artwork, and there could be suitable sub-
167 BRIEF ACCOUNTING DICTIONARY, EXCISE TAX, Cengage Learning, pg 46.
168 A common example is an excise tax on the sale of tobacco or gasoline.
169 Elasticity is how sensitive the demand curve is to a certain independent vari-
able, usually the change in price. MICHAEL R. BAYE, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS
AND BUSINESS STRATEGY 75 (McGraw-Hill International Edition, 7th Ed).
170 Vickers, at 459-60.
171 Vickers, at 460.
172 Id.
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stitutes of artwork that are not affected by droit de suite. There-
fore, this basic economic analysis shows that a droit de suite ren-
ders the demand curve for the art market more elastic and a resale
royalty could likely harm both the secondary and primary art mar-
kets.17 3 Additionally, in an economic application the resale royalty
acts as a discriminatory tax, and could result in the market viewing
artwork subject to a resale royalty as a poor investment.
1. Incentive to Create New Works
One of the major purposes of copyright law is to promote
creativity by protecting an artist's work. 174 A resale royalty right
could support this copyright goal, therefore justifying the legisla-
tion. Although other countries may not emphasize the promotion
of creativity as does the United States, it is still equally important
to protect artists' rights, specifically through droit de suite.175 Art-
ists could have an additional financial benefit from a resale royal-
ty, further promoting creativity by allowing them to maintain their
artistic careers.' 76 Even if the royalty is minimal, it is still addi-
tional revenue that an artist could use to promote his craft. 177 Not
only could living artists benefit from this additional revenue, but it
could also have a positive effect on post mortem benefits. A droit
de suite for a piece of visual art by an artist who has passed away
could allow his heirs to benefit financially. This idea could moti-
vate artists to not only create art, but to excel and have a positive
reputation in the art world, which would benefit their heirs post
mortem with a higher number of sales, and thus a higher amount of
resale royalties.
78
173 id.
174 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.
175 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 36-37.
176 Id. at 37.
177 The increased revenue could be used for supplies, studio space, or other
working expenses that artists encounter during their craft. By allowing artists to
have better access to these expenses, it helps fulfill the Constitutional provision
of copyright.
178 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 37. See. American Society of Illustrators
Partnership ("ASIP"), Comments Submitted in Response to U.S. Copyright Of-
fice's Sept. 19, 2012 Notice of Inquiry at 2 ("ASIP Comments").
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Critics of resale royalties contend that a droit de suite
would not motivate artists to create more artwork. They argue that
visual artists create art based on their own personal inspiration, not
whether they will receive economic compensation from crea-
tion. 179 As Throphile Gautier stated, artists create "art for art's sa-
ke."'180 Another criticism of droit de suite is that dealers may be
unwilling to invest long term in younger artists beginning their ca-
reers knowing that they will have increased transaction costs later.
As one dealer in the United Kingdom said:
It is not encouraging us to deal with less established
artists that is certain, it definitely impacts on my
ability to speculate on riskier artists. I want to sup-
port young artists but this discourages my interest
in doing so, it is not that I don't want to help them
but I am less likely now to purchase outright at an
early stage in the artist's career. 181
Dealers frequently purchase young, up-and-coming artists'
works prior to exhibitions as an investment; these risky invest-
ments often do not yield initial returns. 1 82 With the possibility of a
droit de suite, the price of these young artist's works would have
to increase in order for dealers to make a profit. Dealers have ar-
gued that the increase in price may be unattractive to prospective
buyers; if the dealers know there will be greater difficulty selling
these works, they will be less likely to invest in these artists initial-
ly. 183
Many considerations must be assessed when analyzing
whether a resale royalty will promote the purposes of copyright.
The majority of the speculations on whether a resale royalty would
increase creativity are not supported by solid evidence. 8 4 These
'
7 9 Id. at 38.
180 In French, "L'art pour l'art."
181 Toby Froschauer, The Impact Of Artist Resale Rights On The Art Market In
The United Kingdom, LAPADA, 19 (2008), available at
http://www.lapada.org/public/Impact StudybyTobyFroschauer.pdf.
182 Id.
183 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 38.
184 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Artist Resale Royalties: Do They
Help or Hurt?, FREAKONOMICS (Dec. 22, 2011), available at
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statements are speculative and may even be the result of an over-
confidence bias where individuals have the belief that they possess
some unique trait or ability that allows them to overcome odds,
whereas others do not have this trait. This extreme optimism gives
skewed support for a droit de suite because it is unlikely to know if
this will, in fact, promote creativity.
185
2. The Primary Art Market
Due to the difficulty in obtaining information about the
primary art market, it is problematic to accurately analyze how a
droit de suite in the United States would affect the primary art
market. 186 Not only does the United States have difficulties as-
sessing the future consequences of a droit de suite, but other coun-
tries worldwide, even those who have implemented a resale royal-
ty, have encountered problems empirically analyzing the droit de
suite. For example, Australia posed questions about how a resale
royalty would affect their primary art market in a report corre-
sponding with their resale royalty bill in 2008.187 In its govern-
ment's review of the bill five years later, these questions still had
not been sufficiently answered because they could not deduce the
effect due to the lack of sufficient data to even extrapolate re-
sults. 18 8 This lack of primary art market transparency is trouble-
some if the United States wishes to implement a droit de suite, be-
cause a lack of data
Droit de suite critics have argued that a resale royalty can-
not survive a simple supply and demand analysis. Critics argue
that collectors who will not buy artwork because of the resale roy-
alty will decrease demand, but the supply of art will not increase.
This could cause prices to go down, due to the inverse nature of
supply and demand. Moreover, collectors may demand reduced
prices in the primary market in order to compensate for potential
http://freakonomics.com/2011/1 2/22/artist-resale-royalties-do-they-help-or-
hurt/.
185 Id.
186 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 42.
187 Australia Report, at 34.
188 Australia 2013 Review, at 6.
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royalties in the secondary market.189 This would have a deleterious
effect on artists' payments in the primary market.
Critics of a resale royalty in the United States have stated
that its implementation may prevent buyers from purchasing art on
the primary art market. It is important to note that many art collec-
tors buy art not because of its price. People collect art for a variety
of reasons, including the obvious reason of actually enjoying the
art for its visual and symbolic appeal. Many purchase art for its
aesthetics and not as an investment. 90 Although some collectors
may base their purchases on whether there is a resale royalty or
not, it is important to realize that this may not be the primary rea-
son to make a purchase.
Unless more quantitative data is made available in the pri-
mary art market, it will be nearly impossible to conclude whether
the primary art market will be affected by a droit de suite. Major
legislative decisions cannot be made because of lack of data and
because of speculations on how a droit de suite would affect the
primary market. These decisions are made even more difficult not
because the data is not present, it is because the data is unlikely to
be discovered in the primary art market.
3. The Secondary Art Market
Droit de suite is a concept involving the secondary art
market. The secondary art market is where artwork is resold, pri-
marily through auction houses and private dealers. 19 1 There is lim-
ited information about the economics of the secondary market in
order to protect the privacy of purchasers, but not to the same ex-
tent as the primary market. 192 Supporters and those opposed to a
resale royalty disagree on a droit de suite's effect on this market
for many of the same reasons regarding resale royalties and their
effects on the primary market. Multiple factors that are often ab-
189 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 44.
190 Shira Perlmutter, Resale Royalties for Artists: An Analysis of the Register of
Copyrights'Report. 16 COLUM.-VLA J.L & ARTS 395. 408 (1991-1992).
191 New or Secondhand? The ins and outs of primary and secondary markets,
THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 26, 2009). Available at
http://www.economist.com/node/14941173.
192 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 46.
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sent in the primary art market impact and shape the secondary art
markets. These include commissions, advances, insurance fees,
third-party guarantees, and storage and transportation fees.'
93
Many more influences affect the secondary art market, rendering it
difficult to deduce the impact of a resale royalty.
Again, proponents believe that the increased incentive to
create will cause artists to produce more work, eventually having a
positive effect on the secondary art market.1 94 They argue that the
increased administrative costs in enforcing a resale royalty will be
of minimal concern because buyers and sellers in the secondary art
market already experience a significant amount of transaction
costs. 195 These costs, such as buyer's premiums and fees for un-
sold art at auctions, have nothing to do with benefitting the artist
and are generally much higher than the proposed droit de suite. 1
96
If the threshold for the resale royalty is appropriate, the benefits of
the droit de suite are likely to outweigh the administrative costs of
compliance. 197
Those who oppose a resale royalty argue that by imposing
a droit de suite, the overall incentive to resell artwork may dimin-
ish, thus reducing the secondary art market. Again, the unavailabil-
ity of information poses another problem. If critics argue a resale
royalty will decrease the secondary art market, it is extremely dif-
ficult to prove that droit de suite is the single factor that affects the
market.' A variety of other factors could lead to the secondary art
market's decrease, such as the changes in ways that collectors are
purchasing art, decrease in the supply of artwork, and changes in
taste in artwork. 199 In sum, it is impossible to determine that a re-
sale royalty would destroy the secondary art market. As in the
primary art market, arguments by both supporters and opponents
are speculative.
Opponents fear that if the United States imposes a resale
royalty, the secondary market would leave the United States for
19' Id. at 56.
14 ld. at 46.
'95 Olav Veltuis, Art Markets, A Handbook Of Cultural Economics, at 23-24.
196 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 47.
197 id.
198 Id. at 50.
'99 EC Report, at 7.
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other countries that do not have the droit de suite. As one of the
"global market hubs," the United States cannot afford to lose mer-
chants.200 From an economic standpoint, merchants will sell com-
modities, such as art, where there are less transaction costs im-
posed on them. If a resale royalty adds to transaction costs, sellers
will take this into consideration when choosing locations to sell
their goods.20 Again, it is uncertain whether art merchants' moves
from the United States to other countries are primarily due to a re-
sale royalty. The UK did not record any noticeable changes in
merchants leaving the UK after they implemented a resale royal-
ty. 20 Causality cannot be solely attributed to a droit de suite; a
correlation does not necessarily imply a cause-and-effect relation-
ship. 0 3 The location of the secondary art market also depends on
many other factors such as public taste, the structure of the art
market, taxes, the availability of experts, and the ability to interest
consignors.2z 4
The efficacy of a droit de suite on the secondary market al-
so may depend on the frequency that the artwork is resold. If the
200 According to the EC Report, a "global market hub" is a location where the
highest valued art transactions occur. These are the sales of artwork over
C50,000. EC Report, at 7.
201 EC Report, at 7-8.
202 UK Report at 16.203 Commenting on the potential shift of transactions to countries without a droit
de suite, Gerhard Pfennig from VG Bild-Kunst stated, "we have often heard the
argument that sales would be shifted to other countries, to United States or
Switzerland, to Great Britain. The experience shows that even galleries from
Switzerland, where there is no resale royalty, moved to London... which shows
that t resale royalty, which they have to pay in London, doesn't have any affect
on these business developments because buyers come to London. This is the ef-
fect in Europe, most of the market goes to London, because there are the buy-
ers." Resale Royalty Round Table, at 27-28.
204 See Consultation Preparatoire au Rapport de la Commission Europeenne sur
la Mise en Oeuvre et les Effets de la Directive 2001/84/CE du Parlement Euro-
peen et du conseil du 27 Septembre 2001 Relative au Droit de Suite au Profit de
l'Auteur d'une Oeuvre d'art Originale, 25 (May 2011), available at),
https://circabc.europa.eu/sd/d/5447f8e9-c 1 e2-4d30-a4d6-
12e5295 I Obdf/Authorities of France.pdf.
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artwork is never resold, a resale royalty is not imposed. 205 An artist
may economically benefit more if his work is continually resold as
compared to an artist whose artwork does not resell as often. This
shows that success from a droit de suite may be more analogous to
the artwork's turnover than value based on the art market.2 °6 This
is an important consideration when deciding whether to institute a
resale royalty in the United States.
4. Changes in the Art Market
Although an' arguably broad topic related to resale royal-
ties, it is instructive to address the various changes that are occur-
ring in the modern art market. The movements towards a more
globalized and digital world will continue to have implications on
the art market in the future. Not only has art become more accessi-
ble to the public, but new unprecedented legal issues will have to
be addressed with future legislation. In its report on resale royal-
ties, the United States Copyright Office made it clear that it did not
have any evidence that the growth in art fairs and other non-
traditional art market transactions is a result of the implementation
of resale royalties across the globe.
20 7
a. Art Fairs and the Online Market
Over the past twenty years, the art market has undergone a
revolution secondary to an increase in sales in art fairs.208 There
has been a strong movement towards these fairs where buyers can
purchase works of art directly from dealers and artists as a compet-
itive reaction to the increased power that auction houses pos-
sess.20 9  Today, fairs comprise about thirty percent of dealers'
sales.210 These fairs are open to the public and have allowed the
205 Elliot C. Alderman, Resale Royalties in the United States for Fine Visual Art-
ists: An Alien Concept, 40 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 265, 277 (1992).
206 Id.
207 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 55.
208 Claire McAndrew, The International Art Market in 2011: Observations on
the Art Trade over 25 Years, 65 (2012).
209 McAndrew, at 113.
"o Id. at 114.
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traditional exclusivity of the art market to thrive in a more general
setting.21 1 This allows people who normally would not be able to
collect art to be immersed into the primary and secondary art mar-
kets. Art fairs have affected both the primary and secondary art
markets because artists now have to surrender their own creative
habits to the demands of the art fair schedule.212
The presence of the Internet in art transactions has also ad-
vanced the art market. The use of the Internet has created more ef-
ficient and cost-effective methods for parties to not only com-
municate but also to engage in transactions, regardless of physical
location.213 Currently, many dealers and auction houses have both
websites to provide buyers with information and real-time partici-
pation in auctions. 2 14 Not only are major auction houses and deal-
ers moving toward an online market, but according to the 2013
Online Art Trade Report, fifty-nine percent of the galleries that
were surveyed are planning to incorporate an online purchase op-
tion on their websites. 215 This shows a major trend toward an art
market on the Internet and the potential decrease in the personal
interaction with dealers and auction houses, thus decreasing the
tension that exists between them. "Emergence and growth of In-
ternet marketplaces during the last two decades have fostered an
increase in artistic endeavors by providing more outlets for discov-
ery and remuneration."216
211 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 25.
212 Graham Bowley, For Art Dealers, a New Life on the Fair Circuit, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 2013, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/201 3 /08/ 2 2 /arts/for-art-dealers-a-new-life-on-the-fair-
circuit.html.
213 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 25.
214 See How to Place a Bid, BONHAMS,
http://www.bonhams.com/howtobuy/9879/; Christie's LIVE Online Bidding,
CHRISTIE'S, https://www.christies.com/livebidding/; BIDnow/Watch Live,
SOTHEBY'S, http://www.sothebys.com/en/auctions/watch-live.html.
215 The Online Art Trade 2013, Hiscox & ARTTACTIC, 4-5 (April 9, 2013)
available at http://www. arttactic.com/market-analysis/art-markets/us-a-
european-art-market/559-hiscox-report-online-art-trade- 2013.html?Itemid= 102.
216 eBay, Inc., Comments Submitted in Response to U.S. Copyright Office's
Sept. 19, 2012 Notice of Inquiry at 3 (Dec. 5, 2012).
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b. Changes in Artistic Medium
Although United States' copyright law does not affect the
typical visual artist in the same manner as other types of artists,
visual artists have been able to adapt. The popularity of art repro-
ductions has allowed visual artists to benefit in the same manner as
other artists. The ability of artists to sell reproductions, or "prints"
of their works allows them to receive economic compensation by
selling copies of their works.2 17 Prints have become a significant
influence in the art market as major collectors and museums have
purchased these artworks. 218 It is important to note that artists are
adapting to the changes in the art market as well as being able to
adjust their craft in order to benefit more from the United States'
copyright system. Supporters of a droit de suite constantly make
the argument that visual artists do not receive the same benefits as
other artists, yet in some ways and in some mediums artists can
benefit.
IV. AMERICAN ROYALTIES Too ACT OF 2014 - MOST RECENTLY
PROPOSED LEGISLATION
The Proposed "American Royalties Too Act of 2014"
aimed to provide a royalty to visual artists whose art was resold at
auction. It was introduced on February 26, 2014 by the New York
Democrat Representative Jerrold Nadler to amend title 17 of the
United States Code. 219 His major cosponsor was the Democrat
Senator from Wisconsin, Tammy Baldwin. 220 As of October 2014,
he had fifteen cosponsors in the House of Representatives 221 and
217 These "prints" include etchings, silkscreens, lithographs, aquatints, and ste-
reographs. Vickers, at 463.
218 The Applicability of Droit de Suite, at 463.
2 19 American Royalties Too Act of 2014, H.R. 4103, 113th Cong. This provision
is concerned with an individual's copyrights.
220 Cosponsors of the American Royalties Too Act of 2014, available at
https://www.congress.gov/bill/I 13th-congress/senate-bill/2045/cosponsors.
221 They are, in chronological order of becoming co-sponsors: Louise McIntosh
Slaughter [D-NY-25], James P. Moran [D-VA-8], Grace Meng [D-NY-6], Wm.
Lacy Clay [D-MO-1], Eliot L. Engel [D-NY-16], Donna M. Christensen [D-V1-
At Large], Judy Chu [D-CA-27], John Lewis [D-GA-5], Janice D. Schakowsky
[D-IL-9], Ed Pastor [D-AZ-7], Maxine Waters [D-CA-43], Sam Farr [D-CA-
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one additional co-sponsor in the Senate222. This bill, however, was
unable to survive the 113 th Congress and was never voted on be-
fore the end of the term.223
A. Text of the Bill
The bill proposed that in order to be eligible to collect a re-
sale royalty, the work of visual art must be resold at auction at a
price of $5,000 or more. 224 The proposed bill made it clear that the
artwork must be sold at auction by an individual who is not the
original artist, thus ensuring that this was not the first sale of the
work, but was indeed a resale.225 An artist would receive a royalty
on the initial sale because he directly sold his work to the buyer ei-
ther by himself or through an auction or dealer representing the
artist.
The text of the proposed bill defined the specifics of col-
lecting the royalty. The royalty would be calculated as 5% of the
sale price up to a cap of $35,000.226 These figures would be ad-
justed every year according to the cost-of-living adjustment pro-
vided by that year's Internal Revenue Code of 1986.227 The royal-
ties would be collected within ninety days of the sale by a visual
artists' copyright collecting society which, four or more times a
year would distribute the royalty less reasonable administrative
costs to the artist or the valid copyright holder.2 28 The proposed
bill also defined the eligibility of an artist, or current copyright
20], Mark Pocan [D-WI-2], Theodore E. Deutch [D-FL-2 1], and Shelia Jackson
Lee [D-TX- 18]. See: https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-
bill/4103/cosponsors.
222 Senator Edward J. Markey, a Democrat from Massachusetts is the only Sen-
ate co-sponsor of this bill. https://www.congress.gov/bill/11 3 th-congress/senate-
bill/2045/cosponsors?q=%7B%2
2search%22%3A%5B%22american+royalties+too%22%5D%7D.
223 Coline Milliard, No Artist Resale Rights for US, for Now, ARTNETNEWS,
(Jan. 14, 2015), available at http://news.artnet.com/market/no-artist-resale-
rights-for-us-for-now-220318.
224 American Royalties Too Act of 2014, H.R. 4103, 113th Cong., §(a)(7).
225 Id. at §(a)(7).
226 Id. at §§ 3(b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
227 Id. at §§ 3(B)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
228 Id. at §§ 3(b)(3)(A)-(B)
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holder, to receive royalty payment.229 The artist or current copy-
right owner must have been either a citizen, currently domiciled in,
or created the work of visual art in the United States or another
country that already provides resale royalty rights.
230
The proposed bill had many criteria required of a valid col-
lecting society. This visual artists' copyright collecting society
would be approved to collect the royalties from the auction houses
and distribute them to the artists or the valid copyright owner.
232
In order to become an authorized artists' copyright collecting soci-
ety, the society must have either had previous experience licensing
copyrights of visual artists or have been approved by 10,000 or
more visual artists "directly or thought reciprocal agreements with
foreign collecting societies, to license the rights granted under sec-
tion 106. ",233 If an artists' copyright collecting society failed to
distribute the royalties within five years, it would lose its authori-
zation to collect and distribute future royalties. 234 If an artists'
copyright collecting society failed to pay a royalty, it could have
constituted as copyright infringement subject to payment of the en-
tire royalty and statutory damages.
235
Finally, the proposed bill required the Register of Copy-
rights to conduct a study within five years which would explore
the effects of this proposed bill on the art market and whether this
act should be expanded to "other professionals engaged in the sale
of works of visual art" such as dealers and galleries.
229 American Royalties Too Act of 2014 at §§ 3(b)(6).
23° Id. at §§ 3(b)(6)(A)-(B).
231 Id. at §§ 3(b)(3)(A)(1)(ii), § 5.
232 Id. at § 3(b)(3)(A)(ii).
233 Id. at §§ 5 (A)(i)()-(I1). In the United States, some of the artists' copyright
collection agencies include VAGA (http://vagarights.com) and Artists Rights
Society of New York (http://www.arsny.com). For a comprehensive list of
world-wide copyright collection societies see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/List of copyrightcollectionsocieties.
234 American Royalties Too Act of 2014, H.R. 4103, 113th Cong., § 5(A)(ii)
235 Id. at §§ 3(b)(4)(A)-(B).
236 ld. at § 6
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B. Opposition
The American Royalties Too Act of 2014 faced a great
deal of opposition, especially since it specifically targeted public
auction houses. According to Clare McAndrew, from Art Econom-
ics, only "0.4 percent of artists in the U.S. will benefit from [a
droit de suite]."237 If such a small number of artists would benefit
from this bill, it raises the question whether it is fair on even bene-
ficial for this bill to have solely applied to public auction houses?
Many auction houses in the United States strongly lobbied
against this bill, since it did specifically target sales at auction. So-
theby's spent approximately $1 million in lobbying efforts.238 De-
spite doubts that the bill would pass due to a divided Congress, So-
theby's approached this bill seriously.2 39The bill appeared to be
unfairly directed at auction houses because the droit de suite
would not apply to dealers or galleries. Christie's and Sotheby's,
through their attorney, Simon J. Frankel, responded to the Copy-
right Office's Notice of Inquiry into the possibility of implement-
ing a droit de suite in the United States and expressed their opposi-
tion to the legislation. 240 They argued that a resale royalty would
do nothing to increase the market for emerging artists, stating that
"absent identification of an actual problem in the art market to be
addressed and compelling evidence that a resale royalty will do so,
there are no good reasons to enact a federal resale royalty right in
the country, and many reasons not to do so.
24 1
237 Resale Royalty Round Table, at 121.
238 Patricia Cohen, Lobbyists Set to Fight Royalty Bill For Artists, THE NEW
YORK TIMES. (March 23, 2014). Available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/arts/design/auction-houses-taking-no-
chances-on-american-royalties-too-act.html?r=0
239 id.
240 Letter: Comments of Sotheby's, Inc. and Christie's Inc. (Dec. 5, 2012).
241 Letter: Comments of Sotheby's, Inc. and Christie's Inc. (Dec. 5, 2012).
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V. ANALYSIS
A. Potential Issues and Pitfalls
1. Administration
A major pitfall of the California Resale Royalties Act in-
volved collecting and administering the royalty collected by a col-
lection agency. The text of the bill does give specifics regarding
becoming an authorized collection agency, but it does not discuss
how the collection agency needs to function in order to be success-
ful. 2 4 2 In order to have a practical resale royalty in the United
States, it must be inexpensive to regulate and administer the royal-
ty and it must be enforceable. These were issues that the California
Resale Royalty Act faced and were potential problems for the
American Royalties Too Act. A major reason why the American
Royalties Too Act targeted auction houses is because artists can
much more easily verify that their art is being resold in a public
auction verses being resold in a private gallery.
2. Art Market Transparency and Lack of Information on the Art
Market
When researching the possible effects or consequences of
implementing a droit de suite in the United States, policymakers
face an "information problem. 243 In order to properly analyze the
actual or potential impact of a resale royalty in the United States, a
certain amount of information must be available to the parties in-
volved.244 In the real world application, however, those involved
in the United States market guard this information because of the
lack of transparency in the art market. For example, buyers' and
sellers' identities are often kept secret and the values of artworks
are concealed from the public to promote anonymity in the trans-
242 American Royalties Too Act of 2014, H.R. 4103, 113th Cong., §§ 5
(3)(A)(i)(I)-(II).
243 Stephanie B. Turner, The Artist's Resale Royalty Right: Overcoming the In-
formation Problem, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 329, 333 (2012).
244 Id. at 334.
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actions.245 The prices of these private sales are not recorded or
available to the public.2 46 When the United States Copyright Of-
fice issued its 1992 report, it realized that there was an "infor-
mation problem" and even cited this as one of the reasons that it
advised against adopting a droit de suite; 247 the USCO believed
that it did not have enough "empirical data" to adequately analyze
the outcomes of implementing this right.248 Even the 2013 USCO
Resale Royalties Report stated that it faced difficulties when trying
to analyze data on resale royalties because the majority of that data
comes from the same one or two sources.249 This can be problem-
atic because different sides of the droit de suite argument will sup-
port their respective arguments with the same data.2 50 Obtaining
solid data on the art market is difficult because it is almost impos-
sible to conduct a "controlled experiment and use scientific meth-
od." 2
51
Despite the major informational obstacles that must be
overcome in order to have a more accurate understanding of resale
royalties, there have been improvements. Over the past twenty
years, many new auction price databases, indexes, and analyses re-
sources have emerged 2  These new resources have increased the
245 Erica Coslor, Transparency in an Opaque Market: Auction Prices as Anchors
and Guideposts, 16 (March 22, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
U.S. Copyright Office), available at
http://aahvs.duke.edu/uploads/media-items/coslor-transparency-in-an-opaque-
market-03-22-201 l.original.pdf.246 Id. at pg. 16.
247 See 1992 REPORT at vii, x, 3, 101, 145.248See 1992 REPORT at xv.
249 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 27. These sources are: Art Economics (see
http://www.artseconomi-cs.com) and the studies performed by Kathryn Graddy
et al.
250 Resale Royalties Round Table, pg 103 (Victor S. Perlman).251 Resale Royalties Round Table, pg 103 (Victor S. Perlman). It is difficult to
figure out causality because "there is no way to conduct a controlled experiment
and use scientific method. All we have is some anecdotal information and statis-
tics."
252 Anna Dempster, Trust, but verify, as they say, THE ART NEWSPAPER, (July
11, 2013), available at http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Trust-but-
verify-as-they-say/30096.
These resources include: ArtPrice (http://www.artprice.com), ArtNet
(http://www.artnet.com), Invaluable (http://www.invaluable.com!), Art Market
Research (http://www.artmarketresearch.com), Mei Moses
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transparency of the art market, but there are still many flaws in the
data.2 3 The lack of this information from these transactions pre-
vents accurate results and adds to the uncertainty about the art
market. For example, there is even confusion about the number of
private sales that take place.254 This lack of information not only
prevents proper studies from being conducted on the possible ef-
fects of the droit de suite, but it could potentially impact the suc-
cess of a resale royalty.
3. Sales and Works Subject to a Resale Royalty
The bill made it clear that the resale royalty would have
applied to "works of visual art" and the bill even proposed to con-
solidate the language in 17 U.S.C. § 101's definition for "works of
visual art." 255 Initially, there was some opposition to this because it
did not include works of decorative art such as jewelry, furniture,
architectural structures, and rugs.256 However, no one submitted
any empirical evidence that these items receive substantial profits
on the secondary market, so the definition for "works of visual art"
did not need to be expanded to include these items.
2 5 7
Additionally, with the continuing transformation of the art
market, this bill could have encountered issues because many ma-
jor auction houses now have online auctions. This bill could have
(http://www.artasanasset.com/), ArtTactic (http://www.arttactic.com/), and
Skate's Art Market Research (http://skatesartinvestment.com/).
253 Id.
254 Erica Coslor estimates that private sales account for about 60% of the art
market while public auctions make up about 40%, while Clare McAndrew stat-
ed that "in 2012, auction houses accounted for just 21 percent of domestic sales,
with dealers and galleries accounting for 79 percent." McAndrew, Clare. 2007.
The Art Economy: An Investor's Guide to the Art Market. Dublin: Liffey Press.
255 The bill proposed to changed the definition of "work of visual art" to "A
'work of visual art' is a painting, drawing, print, sculpture, or photograph, exist-
ing either in the original embodiment or in a limited edition of 200 copies or
fewer that bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author and are
consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple
cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively
numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the
author." H.R. 4103 § 2(4)256 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 76.
25 7 id.
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unfairly targeted auction houses because their online sales would
be subject to a royalty, but other online art auctions or dealers who
sell online would not have to pay the royalty. 8 It would have
been difficult to distinguish how the bill would have treated a
regular auction selling online versus other online transactions that
resell art. The bill did define an auction as "a public sale at which a
work of visual art is sold to the highest bidder and which is run by
an entity that sold not less that $1,000,000 of works of visual art
during the previous year."259 This definition, with the threshold
profit off of visual art sales, applies to larger auction houses, thus
many minor auctions would not have had to pay a resale royalty.
4. Alienability and Retroactivity
The bill stated, "the right to collect a royalty... may not be
sold, assigned, or waived except as provided in section 201 .,260
Section 201 of the Copyright Act allows an individual to transfer
his copyright rights "by any means of conveyance." 261 What this
means is that the resale royalty right cannot be alienated unless it
is in the same manner as transferring copyright rights; a visual art-
ist can alienate this right. This is not in harmony with the EU Di-
rective because its droit de suite is both inalienable and un-
assignable. 262 This may be counterproductive in trying to provide
artists more bargaining power. By being able to sign away their re-
sale royalty rights, it is just another right in the bundle of copyright
rights that artists sometimes sign over to purchasers in the primary
market. If this bill made the right absolutely inalienable, it could
have focused on some artists' bargaining power. Critics, however,
argue that if this right was inalienable, many artists would not be
258 "[A resale royalty] also disregards the way the art market is changing. For
instance, Christie's does online auctions too. Because we're an auction house,
we should be subject to a resale royalty on those auctions. Yet, eBay or any of
the other, Gagosian is moving into doing online sales. There are a number of
other entities who are doing eCommerce auctions. Those would be exempt. So
this bill, even besides just targeting one portion, it targets it unfairly." Sandra
Cobden, Christie's Inc, Resale Royalty Round Table, at 211.
259 H.R. 4103 § 2(1).
260 H.R. 4103 § 3(6).
261 17 U.S.C. § 201 (d)(1)
262 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 78.
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able to make as much in the primary art market because now many
sign their rights away to ensure a better purchase price.263 If an art-
ist could not transfer these rights, he might not receive as much
profit from his initial sale.
Another issue with alienability is with reciprocity and the
Berne Convention. The Berne Convention states that droit de suite
is an "inalienable right."264 If the United States enacted legislation
that allowed an artist's resale royalty right to be alienable, there
would be inconsistencies in reciprocity with other countries since
most countries have this as an inalienable right.265 If other coun-
tries find the United State's law insufficient compared to theirs,
United States' artists may have difficulties benefitting from droit
de suite abroad.266 This, again, is counterproductive because the
bill was first enacted in order to promote international reciprocity.
The text of the bill would have applied prospectively. This is im-
portant because if it were to have been applied retroactively, many
more Fifth Amendment issues, such as Takings and Due Process,
would have been challenged.267 The text of the bill, however, was
vague regarding the specifics of application prospectively. For ex-
ample, the Copyright Office's 1992 report defined a prospective
application of a droit de suite as covering works of art that were
created after the effective date of the law. 268 Difficulties could
arise, however, in proving when some artworks were created if
disputes arise around whether a work of art was created before or
after the effective date. Another possible way to bypass this issue
would be for this bill to have applied to works of art that were re-
sold after the effective date. This could be more easily manageable
because the date of creation is irrelevant. Most artists sell their
work directly in the primary market, so any transaction not from
the artist or his dealer would be considered a secondary market
transaction, thus a resale. The American Royalties Too Act should
have been more specific in its language in terms of how it is going
to be applied.
263 id.
264 Berne Convention 14ter(1).
265 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 78.
266 id.
267 Id at 77.
268 1992 Report, at 155.
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B. Possible alternatives to resale royalty legislation
1. Private Contracts - Artists 'Reserved Rights Transfer and Sale
Agreement
There have been attempts to ensure an artist's resale royal-
ty rights through contracts between the artist and the buyer. One of
the most famous contracts was the Artists' Reserved Rights Trans-
fer and Sales Agreement, or the "Projansky Agreement" which
was drafted and published in 1971 by New York Lawyer Robert
Projansky in association with the art dealer Seth Siegelaub. 269 Ac-
cording to this contract, every time a purchaser resold the artwork,
the artist would receive fifteen-percent of the proceeds. 270 In order
to ensure that the artist would receive proceeds for each resale, the
contract would follow the work of art.27 1 This was done by perma-
nently fixing notice of the covenant on the work of art and having
the purchaser agree not to alienate or sell the work without binding
the new buyer to this covenant.
272
Despite being able to contract an artist's resale royalty
rights, there are still many drawbacks to not only the Projansky
Agreement, but also the idea of contracting an artist's rights. In
normal transactions, most artists do not have significant bargaining
power, so it may be extremely difficult to convince a purchaser to
sign a contract that binds him and future purchasers to pay an art-
ist's resale royalty right.273 Another issue with contracting a droit
de suite is enforcement; if this covenant follows the artwork
throughout every resale, it may be extremely difficult to enforce
this right if the artwork is continually resold. Not only would it be
difficult to enforce this contract if it is resold, it may also be diffi-
cult to resell the artwork with this provision that the new buyer
must give the artist fifteen-percent of the proceeds if he resells the
artwork at a future date.274
269 Vickers, at 448.
270 Projansky Agreement, Art. Two (b)
271 Projansky Agreement, Art. Five
272 Projansky Agreement, Art. Two, Art. Five
273 Vickers, at 449.
274 Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is a difficult to find a balance between the United States'
domestic rights and how to better harmonize with the international
art market, which shows why droit de suite has been so problemat-
ic to establish in the United States. Until the information problem
is confronted, an accurate and well-calculated decision for a droit
de suite cannot be made. For Congress to be successful in imple-
menting a resale royalty, it must stop targeting just auction houses
and find a way for it to be more fairly administered throughout the
United States. It seems unlikely that Congress will be successful in
passing federal legislation for artist's resale royalties, especially if
it continues to target only a small portion of the secondary art
market. If Representative Nadler is to be successful in passing an
American droit de suite, he needs to base his bill on empirical data
and to be able to show that American artists need this right; two
pieces of information he may struggle to substantiate due to the
lack of overall data in the art market as a whole. Additionally, the
"American Royalties Too Act of 2014" had many issues that need-
ed to be addressed in order to even be implementable, another rea-
son for its failure. It is a good idea to try to implement more moral
rights for visual artists in the United States; however due to the in-
herent issues and pitfalls it will likely never be an artists' right.
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